







This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 
Photographies, 9 (2), pp. 147-165, 2016.  The definitive version is available online: 
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17540763.2016.1194551
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
1In Photographies 9, 2 (2016); special issue: ‘Photography and Abstraction’, edited 
by John Beck and David Cunningham
Renouncing the Single Image:
Photography and the Realism of Abstraction
Perhaps the fundamental question to be asked is this: can traditional 
photographic representation, whether symbolist or realist in its dominant 
formal rhetoric, transcend the pervasive logic of the commodity form, the 
exchange abstraction that haunts the culture of capitalism?
Allan Sekula
I need to have some bridge between experience and abstraction and some way 
of beckoning people along to a similar understanding … 
Martha Rosler 
Once asked a somewhat facile question concerning what he might ‘propose as an 
ideologically correct use of the photographic medium’, the late Allan Sekula, while 
noting his refusal of the questioner’s own terms, went on, nevertheless, to identify 
some ‘models for work’ through which one might ‘re-examine how we constitute 
photography as an object of critical speculation’. Specifically: ‘I tend to be 
sympathetic to work which … renounces what I think is the fetish of the single image, 
and bases itself on the principles of montage, either relational sets of images, or 
2images and text or images and gesture’ (2004: 156). As he articulates the point at 
rather greater length in an earlier text:
Still photographers have tended to believe naively in the power and efficacy of 
the single image. Of course, the museological handling of photographs 
encourages this belief, as does the allure of the high-art commodity market. 
But even photojournalists like to imagine that a good photograph can punch 
through, overcome its caption and story, on the power of vision alone. (1978: 
869)
Such ‘renunciation’ is scarcely unique to Sekula. It ‘seems fortunate’, suggests John 
Berger, for example, ‘that few museums have had sufficient initiative to open 
photographic departments, for it means that few photographs have been preserved in 
sacred isolation’ (Berger 2013: 17). Instead, Berger writes, a critical photographic 
practice should takes it as its aim ‘to construct a context for a photograph, to construct 
it with words, to construct it with other photographs, to construct it by its place in an 
ongoing text of photographs and images.’ (59). In his recent Photography and its 
Violations, John Roberts similarly suggests that to recover photography’s relationship 
to the ‘claims of realism’ would require a resistance to any transformation of ‘the 
sequential, “scripted”, internally “narrated” content of photography into highlighted, 
unique moments of public consumption’ so as ‘to privilege discrete works from a 
given sequence of images or research program as evidence of the singularity of the 
photographer’s vision’ (55). Championing, in particular, the form of the ‘photo-book’, 
in which ‘the event is brought into extended discursive life’ (116), the possibility of a 
‘new realist practice’ is dependent, Roberts argues, on ‘channeling’ the photograph 
away from ‘the confines of a singular, aestheticizing authorship’ and towards ‘a space 
of systematic relationality for the reinscription of the photograph’ (56, 115). Finally, 
3to take one further example, in his 2006 book devoted to studies of such systematic 
relational forms in Edward Steichen’s The Family of Man, Robert Frank’s The 
Americans and the work of Bernd and Hilla Becher, Blake Stimson forcefully affirms 
seriality as ‘a primary photographic form’ precisely by virtue of its ‘devaluation of 
individual pictures’. As he cites Alan Trachtenberg on Walker Evans: ‘What the 
pictures say, they say in and through the texture of relations that unfold – continuities, 
doublings, reversals, climaxes, and resolutions’ (Stimson, 2006: 30, 27, 33). Or, as 
Stimson puts it himself of The Americans, the force of such epic, ‘comprehensive’ 
work lies in ‘the relations between pictures and between spaces’, not in the singular or 
decisive ‘moments called up by particular photographs or particularly iconic 
representations’ (117-118).1
Generally, as these citations suggest, a renunciation of the single image is 
understood, then, to be rooted in a resistance, first of all, to attempts to restore an 
‘aura’ to photography as a condition of its ‘high art’ status (see Sekula 1978: 860). If 
John Szarkowski’s 1967 MoMA New Documents exhibition is often understood in 
these terms as the most influential model for such aestheticization of the individual 
work, it is by contrast then that Sekula affirms, in exemplary fashion, the work of 
those ‘contemporary photographers’ whose ‘pictures are often located within an 
extended narrative context’, rather than as ‘solitary, sparely captioned photograph[s] 
on the gallery wall’ (1978: 860).2 
Nonetheless, as important as this anti-auratic impulse is to the renunciation of 
the single image, I want to suggest, in the essay that follows, that it is also connected, 
just as crucially (and in part through this), to what might be best described as a 
problem of abstraction. Generally speaking, of course, if abstraction as understood to 
be a concern for photography it is in terms of the ways in which specific images are 
4said to seek to abstract photography from its apparently definitive, even ‘ontological’, 
tasks to figure or represent things – and its consequent ties to the ‘concrete’ and 
‘particular’ – in order (usually on the model of modernist painting) to free itself from 
its traditional representational functions, more often than not in the name of becoming 
‘art’. Conversely, the critique of such work would, then, appear as part of a broader 
questioning of the privilege accorded to the single image, since such ‘abstraction’ (as 
a specific break with figuration) would then be understood as one extreme endpoint of 
a more general tendency to sever – or, precisely, abstract - the ‘subject’ of a 
photograph from, say, its ‘historical context’, so rendering it ‘independent of social 
commentary’ (Dyer 2012: 126); an abstraction that is reinforced by a conception of 
photography itself as that which exists, above all, ‘in order to deal “with the 
immediate present, and with only one moment of that present”’ (Edward Weston, 
cited in Dyer 2012: 126). 
Unsurprisingly, one especially privileged locus classicus for the critique of 
such abstraction is provided in this regard by Walter Benjamin’s writings of the 
1930s, and, in particular, his critique of the Neue Sachlichkeit, in which ‘photography 
is unable to convey anything about a power station or a cable factory other than, 
“What a beautiful world!”’ (Benjamin 1999: 775).3 Benjamin’s celebration of 
Heartfield’s ‘overtly constructed’ images, as an ‘attempt to go beyond the 
phenomenal and ideological surface of the social realm’ (Sekula 1978: 864), is 
understood to oppose, in this sense, not only processes of aestheticization but also 
what George Baker describes as photography’s conceptualization ‘as a profoundly un- 
or a-relational medium’, one that ‘enacts an operation of visual isolation’ through a 
‘photographic logic of division through which our world has developed into so many 
atomized bits and pieces’ (Baker 2013). 
5The obvious conclusion would, then, seem to be that the renunciation of the 
single image would best be understood as an opposition to photography’s 
‘abstraction’ per se. Yet it is already possible to observe a certain tension, or even 
paradox, here. For if the problem with the fetishization of the single image resides in 
the degree to which, without ‘construction’ or ‘combination’, photography becomes 
too ‘abstract’, abstracting the ‘subject’ of the photograph from ‘historical context’, 
rendering it ‘independent of social commentary’, in Dyer’s words (2012: 126), at the 
same time, it is also, in another sense, too ‘concrete’, on this account, since, in 
identifying its core representational possibilities with the sheer particular ‘This’ of the 
‘immediate present’, it displays a faith in the sensuously and aesthetically particular 
that can ultimately say nothing more than, ‘“What a beautiful world!”’ (Benjamin 
1999: 775). To renounce the single image would thus, seemingly paradoxically, 
require that one counter photography’s abstraction from the historical, social relations 
of which it is (concretely) a part by overcoming, at some level, the very concreteness 
that would apparently define its ‘essential’ relation to an ‘immediate present’. In this 
sense, and as Benjamin’s influential objection to the New Objectivity’s inability to 
convey implies, the problem of the ‘fetish of the single image’ also opens up onto a 
rather larger set of questions – what would it mean for photography to be able to 
convey ‘something’ about a power station or a cable factory, if its conventional 
representational capacities are somehow inadequate to this task? – including what, 
therefore, we might mean by a concept like ‘realism’ itself. 
Of course, across the recent history of photography, it is precisely this kind of 
opposition that has often found itself manifested in a broad division between, on the 
one hand, photography as autonomous pictorial art or ‘tableau’ - exemplified by the 
conventions of large-scale formats, colour prints and limited editions - and 
6photography as documentary, for which the image is ‘an analytic, critical inscription 
of a reality it aspires to fathom’, often realised through extended serial or discursive 
forms (see Van Gelder 2012). Indeed, Sekula’s own writings have played a crucial 
part in the articulation of this opposition, as well as of the Benjaminian critique of an 
aestheticised ‘voyeurism’ in photography that contributes ‘little to the critical 
understanding of the social world’ (Sekula 1978: 864). Yet, if the task of a critical 
practice is thus to counter the single image’s abstraction from the ‘context’ of this 
social world, in order to renew its ‘concrete’ relations to that world, the conditions of 
such renewal apparently cannot be found in the concreteness of the image’s own 
intrinsic, individual connection to that world, but instead must, in some sense, be 
‘abstracted’ from this. 
Among other things, it is worth noting that one consequence of this is thus the 
opening up of a particularly crucial distance between, on the one hand, the claims of 
photographic ‘realism’, as a capacity to represent the social world (in something like 
the sense that Sekula often attributes to the nineteenth-century novel), and, on the 
other, that ‘essential realism’, as Sekula calls it (1978: 862), associated with Piercean 
or Barthesian indexicality: that is, the ‘literality of its relation to the world outside 
itself’ (Benn Michaels 2015: 9). Indeed, if, as Roberts puts it, ‘indexicality is 
meaningful [only] insofar as it is subject to an interpretative process of truth-
disclosure, to the claims of realism, so to speak’ (2014: 31), such meaningfulness in 
some sense requires a renunciation of the self-sufficiency of the single image as a 
condition of any photographic ‘realism’ as such, given the essential limitations placed 
upon the capacity of the individual image’s ‘literal’ or concrete relation to the ‘real’ to 
contribute to any genuinely ‘critical understanding of the social world’ (Sekula 1978: 
864).
7Historically, this is a point that is perhaps most famously exemplified in a 
famous passage in Bertolt Brecht’s account of ‘The Threepenny Opera Trial’ that is 
itself cited by Sekula on a number of occasions:
The situation becomes so complicated [today] because less than at any time 
does a simple ‘reproduction of reality’ tell us anything about reality. A 
photograph of the Krupp factories or the AEG provides virtually no 
information about these institutions. True reality has slipped over into 
functional reality. The reification of human relations, the factory, let’s say, no 
longer reveals these human relations to us. Therefore, something has actually 
to be constructed, something set up. (cited in Adorno 1991: 128)4 
Yet, it is worth noting that Brecht also adds a further dimension in this passage to the 
problem of the relationship between realism and abstraction, since, here, the general 
inadequacy of photography’s ‘essential realism’ to grasp ‘true reality’ equally reflects 
a representational dilemma that stems from, so to speak, the peculiar nature of the 
social reality of capitalism as such. As Adorno puts it, commenting on this passage, 
‘If the world is to be seen through, it can no longer be looked at’. In capitalist 
modernity, the ‘ens realissimum consists of processes, not immediate facts, and they 
cannot be depicted’ (128). Hence, the paradoxical attempt, via ‘construction’ or 
narration, to ‘conjure up in perceptible form’ a society that has, as Adorno puts it, 
with ‘the irresistible ascendancy of the exchange principle’, itself ‘become abstract’ 
(123-24). As I cited Sekula at the beginning of this essay, if the problem is one of how 
photographic representation can ‘transcend the pervasive logic of the commodity 
form, the exchange abstraction that haunts the culture of capitalism’ (Sekula 1984: 
80), this is a question that is itself necessarily framed by a problem of realism – not so 
much as a question of how to escape from abstraction altogether (as it might 
8conventionally be understood), but of what would be the appropriate forms of 
relationality through which to ‘capture’ and thus ‘fathom’ a world that is itself 
intrinsically ‘haunted’ by such social forms of ‘abstraction’ themselves. For the very 
condition of a photographic realism would lie, in this light, in its capacity to offer 
‘critical understanding’ of a larger (social-economic) problem of abstraction as an 
objective reality in a wider sense – that abstraction, as Adorno puts it elsewhere, 
which ‘is the fault not of fantastic, wilful thinking … but of the objective abstraction 
to which the social process of life is subject – the exchange relation’ (Adorno, 2003: 
120; translation modified). 
A Phenomenological Point
What then does this mean for the ‘realism’ of the photographic image? A useful 
starting point is provided by the beginning of one of Sekula’s own works. ‘Growing 
up in a harbour predisposes one to retain quaint ideas about matter and thought’, 
writes Sekula in the opening lines of the published, photo-book version of Fish Story 
(1995; second edition 2002: 12). Appearing after an initial sequence of two 
photographs captioned as ‘Boy looking at his mother. Staten Island Ferry. New York 
harbour. February 1990’ (although, in fact, the boy appears only in the second picture; 
the first being of a coin-operated tower viewer looking out to sea, which in the 
subsequent picture the boy is grasping), Sekula returns in this first page to the 
autobiographical particularities of his own childhood, but only so as to outline what 
he defines as the typicality of the harbour’s ‘common culture’: an ‘insistence on the 
primacy of material forces’, a ‘crude materialism’. As he continues: ‘In the past, 
harbour residents were deluded by their senses into thinking that a global economy 
9could be seen and heard and smelled. The wealth of nations would slide by in the 
channel’ (12). 
If this is indeed consigned to modernity’s past, a now ‘shattered’ common 
culture rendered ‘quaint’ or even delusional in its faith in the immediately visible and 
the primacy of material forces, it is then precisely, Fish Story suggests, because it 
fails, like Brecht’s hypothetical photograph of ‘the Krupp factories or the AEG’, to 
register the inevitable disconnect between what ‘one sees’ and what would be 
necessary, in the global capitalist modernity of today, to ‘explain’ this. ‘What one sees 
in the harbour is the concrete movement of goods’. But this ‘movement’ itself ‘can be 
explained in its totality only through recourse to abstraction’, that is, through a 
reference to what cannot be seen, or, obviously, photographed. (‘Marx tells us this’, 
Sekula notes, ‘even if no one is listening anymore’.5) While, therefore, the harbour as 
‘the site in which material goods appear in bulk’ may appear to be opposed, in the 
geography of global capitalism, to the disembodied forms of ‘the stock market [as] the 
site in which the abstract character of money rules’, the fact that it is the abstraction of 
the ‘very flux of exchange’ that determines ‘the concrete movement of goods’ 
themselves implies an obvious complication. Indeed, the ‘more regularized, literally 
containerized, the movement of goods in harbours’ becomes, Sekula suggest, ‘the 
more the harbour comes to resemble the stock market’ (2002: 12) in its effective 
actualization of a forms of capitalist abstraction in the material world.
If this is most evident, as Fish Story constructs it, in the transformation of the 
harbour into what is less a particular, local ‘site’ – the possible subject of, say, a 
picturesque photograph - than a mere node, an ‘accelerated turning-basin’ in the vast 
global distribution systems of international container transport – the book’s first page 
of text is followed by a sequence of photographs that include images of a crane 
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unloading containers from Asia in Los Angeles Harbour and the automated ECT/Sea-
Land cargo terminal in Rotterdam – then its consequences are most directly graspable 
in what Sekula terms a ‘crucial phenomenological point’:
Goods that once reeked – guano, gypsum, steamed tuna, hemp, molasses – 
now flow or are boxed. The boxes, viewed in vertical elevation, have the 
proportions of slightly elongated banknotes. The contents anonymous: 
electronic components, the worldly belongings of military dependents, 
cocaine, scrap paper (who could know?) hidden behind the corrugated sheet 
steel walls emblazoned with the logos of the global shipping corporations. 
(2002: 12)
Nowhere on Sekula’s opening page, or, indeed, anywhere much else in the various 
texts included in Fish Story, is a connection between this ‘phenomenological point’ 
and the photographic image itself directly mentioned. Still, it is not hard, I think, on 
the basis of the above, to see an analogy implied in Fish Story therefore between the 
‘crude materialism’ of the harbour inhabitant, on the one hand, and that of a certain 
photographic ‘realism’, on the other. In fact, although its stress is slightly different, 
this is clearly one dimension of what Sekula describes elsewhere as a ‘paradox’ at the 
very heart of photographic discourses more generally: that ‘a medium that is seen as 
subtly responsive to the minutest details of time and place delivers these details 
through an unacknowledged, naturalized, epistemological grid’, or, that is, through 
what is a mode of abstraction: 
Photography would seem to be a way of knowing the world directly – this is 
the scientistic aspect of our faith in the powers of the photographic image. But 
photography would also seem to be a way of feeling the world directly, with a 
11
kind of prelinguistic, affective openness of the visual sense – this is the 
aestheticist aspect of our faith in the medium. (Sekula 2004: 143)
If the latter ‘affective openness of the visual sense’ would seem to be a central 
function of the individual image’s own potential for aestheticization (whether in 
pictorialism or in a certain ‘aesthetic’ appropriation of ‘painterly’ abstraction itself6), 
what Sekula describes as those scientistic ‘features of photography that are inherently 
tied to a logic of domination – and a logic of a kind of conflation of abstraction and 
representation’ (2004: 155) – evidently take the form of an opposing ‘instrumental 
realism’ devoted to the attempt to ‘attempt to link optical empiricism with abstract, 
statistical truth’ (Sekula 2004: 124-125; see also Berger 2013: 69-73). But it is, more 
generally, this ‘conflation of abstraction and representation’, and its complex 
relationship to forms of (artistic) realism, that is then, perhaps, most germane to the 
discussion here. 
Certainly, there can be little doubt that it is such a historical ‘conflation of 
abstraction and representation’ that underlies, for example, Sekula’s critique 
elsewhere of the ‘echoes of scientistic notions of photographic truth’ at stake in the 
relational forms of a photographer like August Sander’s ‘liberal, enlightened, and 
even socially critical pedagogy’, with its enthusiasm for an idea of photography as a 
‘universal language’ (Sekula 2004: 131),7 where it is the very formal organization of 
the relational images - ‘a neatly arranged chessboard’, or grid, as Sekula describes it 
(136) – which entails that, ‘[d]espite its class realism’, Antlitz der Zeit ‘is one of the 
most truly abstract bodies of work in the history of photography’ (Sontag 1979: 61; 
emphasis added). At the same time, however, it is in the context of what Sekula 
describes as an attempt to ‘locate universal language claims for photography within 
the historical context of universalized commodity exchange’ (2002: 22; emphasis 
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added) that, for example, Fish Story’s own fixation on the shipping container as 
exemplary symbol and agent of abstraction – the ‘very emblem of capitalist 
disavowal’ (Sekula 1999: 248) – also takes on a representational significance. For, as 
the German media theorist Alexander Klose puts it in his study The Container 
Principle, the emergence of container transport as a dominant technology of global 
trade ‘itself effected major abstractions and created signs’ (2015: 103). In so far as the 
container ‘concentrates a complex technical and social process into one mediating and 
integrating thing that both executes and represents this process’, it becomes, as Klose 
suggests, ‘not only an icon but a pictogram of globalization’ (79) - not least, of 
course, for what we might term the epic form of Fish Story itself, which attempts thus 
to represent, through its own critical ‘conflation and abstraction and representation’, 
the (abstract) capitalist relations constitutive of globalization by tracing, both 
photographically and textually, the (concrete) movement of goods in container 
transportation at a planetary scale (see Cunningham 2010). 
A project conceived in the early 1980s and completed towards the end of the 
following decade, Fish Story’s representational focus on the sea as a forgotten space 
of global capitalist flows embodies its renunciation of the single image in combining 
‘long edited sequences of still photographs’, characteristic of a photodocumentary 
practice (and centred, in particular, on the ‘forgotten’ labour of those employed in 
maritime trade), with ‘lengthy novelistic texts’ and essayistic meditations on the form 
of the panorama and on the sea and harbour as objects of art history (see Sekula 1978: 
879). Consequently, it is indeed less the accumulation of individual images 
themselves that is foregrounded – images that can often seem deliberately minimal in 
their ‘aesthetic’ or affective force (‘he is no Salgado’, as one commentator puts it 
(Edwards 2015: 39)) – but, rather, the meaning of their organisation, of their 
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connective shape and chains of contiguity, as a ‘constructive’ practice inextricably 
tied to the relational forms constitutive of capitalist relations themselves, and as the 
condition of a ‘realist’ engagement with ‘abstraction’ that is necessary to grasping ‘in 
its totality’ what is seen (or is, indeed, photographable) in the ‘concrete movement of 
goods’ itself. If Fish Story is thus marked by what, say, Stefan Jonsson describes as an 
epic attempt to ‘bring human life in the global system into the field of representation’ 
through the synecdoche of maritime commerce, its renunciation of the single image 
not only seeks ‘to connect the small details and individual lives of the present’ with 
‘the larger circulation of values’ that constitute that ‘global system’ – something like a 
definition of the modern epic - but seeks to render ‘visible as though for the same 
time’ the very forms of abstraction which animate that system itself (Jonsson 2010: 
121; see Cunningham 2010). 
Narration and Description
Nonetheless, Jonsson’s admirable description of Fish Story’s ‘immense ambition’ 
leaves us with an obvious dilemma. For, if such ambition is located in this rendering 
visible of that ‘larger circulation of values’ to which, in renouncing the single image, 
the ‘detail’ or individual photograph must be ‘connected’, how exactly is this process 
of visualization to be understood, given the fundamental invisibility of that ‘larger 
circulation of values’ itself, the systematic relationality of which is ‘located’ in ‘the 
abstract character of money’ and the ‘very flux of exchange’? 
In Fish Story, of course, at the centre of this question is the reality of that ‘very 
strange thing’, the commodity (Marx, 1976: 163), at once ‘perceptible and 
imperceptible by the senses’, as one translation of Capital puts it.8 Formed precisely 
via exchange’s abstraction from the substance of use value (so as to make different 
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‘things’ exchangeable), and so assuming primacy over those physical ‘concrete 
goods’ that exchange is initially supposed to mediate, value effectively ‘takes 
possession’ of its own material conditions, which thus become subordinated as 
‘moments’ within its self-movement. Yet if, then, as Marx writes, ‘the products of 
labour become commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time 
suprasensible’ (1976: 165) - sinnlich übersinnliche: ‘sensory super-sensory’ -  as 
commodity form, the commodity is, in this sense, itself absolutely abstract: ‘Not an 
atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values; in this it is the 
direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical 
objects’ (Marx, 1976: 138). And this is not, crucially, because its ‘reality’ is 
straightforwardly hidden behind what is available to vision, in something like a ‘false 
consciousness’, but because it is, in its very essence, non-perceptible: a real 
abstraction, as Alfred Sohn-Rethel famously terms it.
In a short essay on Balzac, published in the early 1960s, and from which his 
own citation of Brecht’s comments on the representational dilemma of the photograph 
derives, it is the consequences of this for an understanding of (literary) ‘realism’ that 
Adorno, for one, seeks to engage. Balzac’s significance as a realist, Adorno argues, 
lay in the fact that he ‘brought society as totality … down from the airy realm of ideas 
to the sphere of sensory evidence’ (1991: 133). However, in doing so, Balzac had also 
to reproduce such a totality ‘by no means only [as] an extensive totality … the 
physiology of life as a whole in its various branches’, but also as an ‘intensive 
totality’ in the form of a ‘functional complex’ (122): ‘A dynamic rages in it: society 
reproduces itself only as a whole, in and through the system, and to do so it needs 
every last man as a customer’ (133). As this final point suggests, the principal means 
of this self-reproduction is above all the real abstraction of money, which, on the one 
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hand, patterns the lives of all the characters in La Comédie humaine, and connects 
them together (as it does, at an even more epic scale, the global maritime trade that is 
Fish Story’s subject), but which, on the other, since it is not itself a part of ‘the sphere 
of sensory evidence’, constituted a ‘veil’ that Balzac was unable to ‘penetrate’. This 
is, then, what Adorno terms Balzac’s paradoxical struggle to ‘conjure up in 
perceptible form’ a society that has, with ‘the irresistible ascendancy of the exchange 
principle’, itself ‘become abstract’ (123-24), and in which Balzac’s own ‘ardour’ for 
concreteness already risks, like the ‘crude materialism’ of Sekula’s harbour dwellers, 
masking a ‘crisis’ in the ‘reality’ of concreteness itself (cited in Adorno 1991: 128). 
Adorno’s argument here can be read as a response, in part at least, to some of 
those problems surrounding ‘realism’ in the novel raised by Georg Lukács’ pivotal 
writings of the 1930s, and, especially, the essay ‘Narrate or Describe?’, in which it is 
the ‘abstraction’ of both naturalism and modernism, as opposed to the authentic 
realism of Balzac, that precisely, for Lukács, marks its submission to ‘capitalist 
prose’. But before coming directly to this, it may help to elucidate something of what 
is thus at stake in these debates by turning first to a comparison between Fish Story 
and the concerns of a photographer to which his own have often been related: Andreas 
Gursky. 
In her recent book Forgetting the Art World, Pamela Lee begins her chapter 
entitled ‘Gursky’s Ether’ with a picture by the German photographer that seems 
deliberately placed for its contrast with Sekula’s work: Gursky’s 1990 photograph 
Salerno of a southern Italian port. The substance of Lee’s argument is worth quoting 
at length:
[No] matter just where things are plotted relative to the standard coordinates of 
foreground, middle ground, and background, nearly everything seems 
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available to the same inexhaustible visuality [in Gursky’s image] … as if 
everything was equalized by some invisible and ambient wash. No focal points 
structure our response to the picture, because the resolution is everywhere the 
same. … It’s as if some alien presence, collecting all the visual data its 
unearthly prospect affords, could only fail to discriminate among the 
miscellany down there. (Lee 2012: 72)
Lee is unpacking here a number of distinctive aspects of Gursky’s large-scale 
chromogenic images that have been frequently enumerated in commentaries on his 
work: the affective force of their sheer size when exhibited (a ‘scale akin to a history 
painting’ (73)), which has often been interpreted in relation to a tradition of the 
sublime; their intriguing topographical form, and the ‘impossible’ perspective views 
that they evoke; their striking intensity of detail; their ‘smooth, near liquid spatiality’ 
and a kind of ‘depthless horizontality’ that derives, in part, from Gursky’s use of 
digital manipulation (76, 83); and, finally, what we might term their unusually 
exhaustive ‘alloverness’ as pictorial, even ‘painterly’ images. (‘Visually’, Gursky 
himself has commented of his photographs of swimming pools, they ‘reminded me of 
hard-edge paintings, and I found it exciting that this could be achieved by 
photography’ (cited in Hentschel: 32).) More interesting, however, is the ways in 
which Lee here interprets this ‘picturesque detailism’ as itself analogous to, or a kind 
of index of, global capitalism’s own apparent ‘everywhereness’, ‘unmoored from both 
the territorial and material’, and, hence, what she calls an ‘ethereal’ imagining of 
capital that is then imagined to ‘bathe all social relations in an ambient and allover 
wash’ (89; emphasis added). Lee’s analogy comes from Marx’s Grundrisse, where he 
defines a mode of production as that ‘particular ether which determines the specific 
gravity of every being which has materialized within it’ (cited Lee 2012: 87), as well 
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as from what she identifies as the ‘strange reappearance’ of ethereal imagery in ‘the 
occasionally converging realms of mysticism and cyberspace’ (78). Gursky’s ‘highly 
qualified’ realism thus projects, she argues, ‘a world in which the availability of 
everything for visual consumption tallies with the seeming availability of 
communications and the market’, organised through an ‘invisible connective tissue 
that binds all of his details together’ and ‘equalizes all it contains’ (77). Assisted by 
the use of the computer, the ‘essential realism’ of the photograph’s indexical relation 
to the particular ‘This’ is not, then, so much negated in this instance, as it is 
effectively ‘dislocated’ and ‘disembedded’ – abstracted – from any ‘real-world 
coordinates’ or specific ‘site’ (86) in a way that mirrors the ‘de-materializations’ of 
contemporary capitalism itself. ‘Fashioned of clustered geometries and topographies 
as closed as stage sets’, a resulting picture like Salerno, writes Lee, is, unlike Sekula’s 
images of labour, ‘strangely pristine, tamed of the bustle and noise you might expect 
of a harbour setting’ (70). As Lee suggests, it is here that ‘Allan Sekula’s work 
provides a counterpoint to Gursky’s ethereal sensibilities’ (37).
Lee’s contrast between Gursky’s and Sekula’s respective projects can easily 
be understood, then, to conform to a now standard opposition between photography’s 
pictorial and documentary modes, between the singular ‘auratic’ image and the 
‘analytic, critical inscription of a reality’, of the type that I have already detailed (see 
Van Gelder 2012). But, significantly, it also touches upon what can be regarded as a 
set of antinomies intrinsic to broader discussions of ‘realism’ more generally. In 
particular, and most importantly, Lee’s critique of the ways in which Gursky’s images 
‘equalize’, in an inexhaustible visuality, the ‘coordinates of foreground, middle 
ground, and background’, and hence exhibit a failure to ‘discriminate’, recall a set of 
distinctions that are perhaps most canonically articulated in the essay by Lukács I 
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referred to a moment ago, ‘Narrate or Describe?’, in which, writing of the nineteenth-
century novel, he suggests a fundamental distinction between a ‘naturalist’ such as 
Emile Zola’s ‘obsession with monographic detail’ – in which the representation of 
reality ‘has lost its capacity to depict the dynamics of life’ -  and the capacity of 
Balzac’s novels to make us ‘experience events which are inherently significant … 
because of the general social significance emerging in the unfolding of the characters’ 
lives’ (Lukács 1970: 147, 116).9 ‘In such an abstract view’, Lukács writes, ‘life 
appears as a constant, even-tenored stream or as a monotonous plain sprawling 
without contours’ (122; emphasis added). ‘Narration establishes proportions, 
description merely levels’ (127).
It is this distinction that is reiterated, too, in, for example, Fredric Jameson’s 
recent Antinomies of Realism, where it appears as an opposition between the two 
interwoven forms of the ‘story’ (or narration) and what he calls, variously, the 
‘descriptive’, the ‘affective’, or the ‘scenic’ (or showing) in the realist novel. If, once 
again, the ‘descriptive impulse’ is thus what constitutes ‘the most inveterate 
alternative to narrative’ (Jameson 2013: 8), it is, Jameson writes, because it ‘always 
seems to single out a painterly moment in which the onward drive of narrative is 
checked if not suspended altogether’ (8). An ‘excess of the sensory becomes 
autonomous, that is to say, it begins to have enough weight of its own to 
counterbalance the plot’ (50).
Like Lukács himself, Jameson makes no explicit link between such facets of 
literary realism and the emergence of photography (see Armstrong 1999: 5; 
Cunningham 2014: 31-32). Nonetheless, as Francois Brunet notes, such an association 
of photography with the descriptive mode has become a pretty familiar one in both 
literary and art history at least since ‘Paul Valery’s 1939 “parallel” between the 
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advent of photography and that of the “descriptive genre”’ in the novel proposed in 
his essay ‘The Centenary of Photography’ (2009: 113-114). Moreover, as Steve 
Edwards, for example, has emphasised, one of the most important problems faced by 
early claims for photography’s ‘art’ status were associated with its placing within a 
‘history of images’ for which the ‘descriptive and realistic’, associated with a 
‘superabundance of detail’, was understood as inferior to an educated stress on ‘broad 
or general effects and idealized forms’. The claim to intelligibility as ‘art’ had, then, 
necessarily to be constituted, against its ‘essential realism’, through photography’s 
possible distance from the particular or contingent ‘features of the world’ (and thus in 
favour of a certain ‘abstraction’ as idealization or generalization from the particular); 
a distancing that, it could be argued, is itself repeated in a different form in later 
twentieth-century attempts to yoke photography to modes of formal(ist) abstraction 
largely derived from modern painting (Edwards 2006: 14-15).
In essence, this would seem to be the central thrust of Lee’s critical reading of 
what she calls Gursky’s ‘detailism, [his] peculiar “reality effect”’:
When the phrase l’effet du reel first appeared in literary criticism in 1968, 
courtesy of Roland Barthes, it described the reality-making strategies of the 
nineteenth-century novel, in which an accumulation of detail did less to 
advance any ostensible plot than to produce a kind of narrative ambience, an 
atmosphere. For his part, Gursky indulges a surfeit of descriptive possibility, 
excess piled on excess … [in which] everything in his pictures is visually 
available. (Lee 2012:73-76).
What is interesting in Lee’s account of this general visual availability, then, is the 
ways in which what appears, for Lee, from one perspective, as the problem of 
Gursky’s abstraction – the ‘ethereality’ of his images, and their disembedding of any 
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indexical relation from a particular site or concrete lifeworld – is, at the same time, 
and seemingly paradoxically, a problem of too much detail, a ‘surfeit’ of ‘concrete’ 
particulars which, in their endless exchangeability or ‘equivalence’, render everything 
perceptible, without ‘proportion’ or ‘plot’. 
‘Highly qualified’ as Gursky’s ‘realism’ may be, on Lee’s account, if this is a 
critique of abstraction, therefore, it is one that cannot be reduced to a critique of any 
straightforward ‘negation of outward reality’ as such (Lukács 1962: 25), since the 
‘detailism’ of its ‘peculiar “reality effect”’ would – like, say, Zola in the novel - be 
obviously at odds with any negation of representational functions per se. However, it 
is at this point that Lukács himself performs a kind of inversion whereby the 
seemingly all-too-concrete prose of description is said, unlike narration, to mask what 
is actually a more fundamental abstraction inherent to it. As he puts it: ‘Because it is 
the ultimate in uniqueness, as Hegel recognised, the “here and now” is absolutely 
abstract. … [T]he craze for the fleeting moment and for a factitious concreteness of 
twentieth-century European literature results in abstraction’ (1970: 171). By reducing 
‘detail to the level of mere particularity’, both modernism and naturalism, Lukács 
claims, replace, in this fashion, ‘concrete typicality with abstract particularity’, in 
which ‘[e]very person, every object, every relationship can stand for something else’ 
(1962: 43, 42). 
Tellingly, it is this conception of a relationality in which each image or thing 
‘can stand for something else’ within a general structure of indifference and 
equivalence – and which, for Lee, is reflected in Gursky’s lack of ‘discrimination’ or 
‘plotting’ - that returns us, by a circuitous route, to what Sekula himself identifies as 
the ‘paradox’ at the very heart of photographic discourses more generally: that ‘a 
medium that is seen as subtly responsive to the minutest details of time and place 
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delivers these details through an unacknowledged, naturalized, epistemological grid’ 
(2004: 143). Indeed, it is precisely such a formal connection between photography 
and a specifically capitalist abstraction that famously guides Sekula’s fascination with 
an 1859 essay by Oliver Wendell Holmes in which he finds already an explicit 
analogy between photographic technology and the capitalist exchange process 
grounded in the ways in which photography functions to produce a global 
encyclopaedic economy of images governed by ‘a comprehensive system of 
exchanges’, or what he calls the development of ‘a universal currency’. If this is 
constituted on the basis of photography’s own distinctive power of abstraction 
instantiated in its ability to divorce a ‘form’ from the ‘matter’ of the real world so as 
to make it indifferently ‘visually available’, as Sekula summarises: ‘For Holmes, 
photographs stand as the “universal equivalent”, capable of denoting the quantitative 
exchangeability of all sights … reduc[ing] all sights to a relation of formal 
equivalence’ (Sekula 2004: 147, 148).10 
It is in this sense, paradoxically, that the endlessly particular, concrete 
attentiveness of the photograph to ‘the minutest details of time and place’ may thus, 
on Sekula’s account, also be understood to risk leading to a more fundamental 
abstraction in precisely Lukácsian terms. For insofar as it denotes ‘the quantitative 
exchangeability of all sights’ associated with that lack of any ‘natural’ or intrinsic 
limit on what the photographic image might depict or incorporate, it also becomes the 
formal expression of an abstraction which here mirrors a parallel lack with regard to 
what can be concretely exchanged in the universalization of the exchange value form. 
To return to the world ‘represented’ in Fish Story, if, as Klose suggests then, both 
‘containers and currency’ are, for example, ‘metaoperators of circulation that smooth 
differences, create connections amid separation, and treat unequal things identically’ 
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(2015: 99-100) – defined by a ‘constitutive emptiness, or evacuability, which makes 
the container a universal receptacle’ (66) – this is, when it is read through Holmes’ 
essay, no less true of the potentially ‘containerizing’ qualities of the photographic 
form also (1983: 195). 
In this sense, part of what the history of both photography and the novel’s 
theorizations have confronted in the problem of ‘realism’, and of the antinomies of 
description and narration, is precisely, one might say, the irreducible actuality of 
abstraction within the very concrete everydayness of modern life as a whole, and 
hence the ways in which capitalist forms come to structure the problem of ‘reality’ as 
an object of representation for any ‘realism’ itself. Indeed, arguably, it is in this way 
that all ‘realism’ can be said to be intrinsically ‘haunted’ by a certain spectre of the 
invisible: by what Marx termed that ‘self-moving substance which is Subject’, in the 
‘shape of money’, or of capital itself (Marx, 1976: 255-6).
Series and Narration
In a conversation with Benjamin Buchloh, Martha Rosler offers a comparison 
between the work of Ed Ruscha, on the one hand, and the photo-narratives of Walker 
Evans and Robert Frank, on the other, to the degree that both effect a renunciation of 
the single image:
[B]oth have structural elements in common: the structured image itself and the 
sequencing. Yet they are opposites. In Twenty-Six Gasoline Stations that 
sequence is one plus one plus one, and it is a simple accretion that makes the 
point. In Evans and Frank, it is one plus two plus three plus four, so the actual 
sequence and the content makes a difference. Yet they both depend on 
seriality, something that the photo world did not permit. (Buchloh 1998: 37)
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Rosler’s comparison between Evans and Ruscha is not necessarily a critical one, but it 
does serve to throw some productive light upon not only the contrast between 
Sekula’s and Gursky’s projects, as Lee presents these, but on the divergent forms that 
a renunciation of the single image may consequently take in the face of the 
representational dilemmas posed by contemporary capitalism.
It is significant, in this light, that if Lee herself largely focuses on Gursky’s 
photographs as single images (which is indeed their usual conditions of display in a 
gallery or museum context), there is another sense in which these individual images 
only themselves really acquire their full meaning when considered in their effective 
serial organisation across the German photographer’s ongoing project as a whole. 
That is to say, as one component in the ‘sum total effect’ provided by what Lee 
herself calls a ‘visual primer of the world market’ (73), an individual image like 
Salerno is less a simple auratic work to be contemplated in its splendid isolation 
(although it may also be this), than it is what Gursky refers to as a ‘piece in the 
puzzle’; part of an open series synecdochically ‘mapping’ a visual ‘landscape’ of 
globalizing capitalism. The forms of repetition (both internal and external to the 
single image) characteristic of Gursky’s work – what Rosler terms a ‘one plus one 
plus one’ of accretion - function, in this sense, to gesture towards ‘totality’, 
constituting something like an accumulative ‘survey’ of contemporary spatial forms, 
technologies and architectures. Or, in other words, if what is often described as 
‘panoramic’ in Gursky’s images is as much a question of their relational form, of the 
repetitions between images, it is in this that they are readable as a peculiarly 
contemporary reworking of a certain modernist impulse to extract abstraction from 
the social world so as to reflect upon it as form. 
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While not seeking to dilute Lee’s criticisms, my point is not simply, then, that, 
placed alongside Sekula, Gursky ‘has no comparable aspiration towards documentary’ 
(Johsson 2010: 121) – although this is also true – but that the essentially anti-
narrative, descriptive mode of his work engages the reality of abstraction in a quite 
different fashion, through the ways in which the repetition of forms across the (open) 
series effectively mimes the repetition and inexhaustibly of capitalism’s own 
actualization of abstraction in the ‘social world’. (As with Ruscha or Warhol, whether 
this “miming” of capitalist forms of repetition is, in any meaningful sense, critical of 
such abstraction is, of course, a different question.) By contrast, what Sekula terms his 
own ‘“paraliterary” revision of documentary photography’ - which explicitly 
privileges the novelistic and cinematic over the pictorial or painterly - is manifested in 
its correlation with realist narrative, as a mediation of – so to speak – photography’s 
(irreducible) descriptive mode, in which narrative sequence – or story - re-presents a 
kind of temporal set of relations (rather than a ‘one plus one plus one’) and, hence, 
holds out the promise of a kind of critical understanding of, through giving narrative 
shape to, certain processes of capitalist abstraction.
As various commentators have noted, as a ‘constructive practice’, then, the 
overcoming of the fetish of the single image in Sekula has, by evident contrast to 
Gursky’s work, the specifically narrative purpose to ‘recover connections elided by 
capitalism’, or ‘causal connections that have been severed or weakened’, in a situation 
in which actual ‘huge distances separate products from the labour processes that 
produce them’ (Day 2015: 58, 60; emphasis added). Understood as an extended, 
realist documentary project, Fish Story certainly conforms in this light to a broader 
definition of the latter’s task as one of ‘bringing into vision new characters occluded 
from the neoliberal media’ (Edwards 2015: 41), via a spatial reordering of the image 
25
that through photography (as well as text) renders visible what is otherwise invisible, 
hidden or anonymous. As Sekula puts it in his short introduction to a film made with 
Noel Burch, The Forgotten Space – against the ‘myths’ of what he calls a de-
materialised ‘post-industrial society’ – narration and the photographic image combine 
to make visible the otherwise hidden ‘fact’ that sea trade remains ‘an integral 
component of the world-industrial system’ – populated by ‘invisible workers on the 
other side of the globe’ (Sekula and Burch, 2011: 78-79; emphasis added). 
From this perspective, the critique of the fetishism of the single image is also, 
practically, a working against the fetishism of commodities themselves, insofar as it is 
precisely the concrete forms of labour required to produce commodities, and the 
social relations of cooperation intrinsic to them, that are rendered invisible in the 
commodity’s ‘fetish-like’ character by making them ‘appear as relations between 
material objects, instead of revealing them plainly’ (Marx, 1976: 169). As Klose 
rightly claims in the context of containerization, the ‘modern myth of immaterial 
technology fantasizes about immateriality and eternal, almost lossless readiness, 
where it is actually an abstraction’ (234; emphasis added). As a kind of ‘social 
hieroglyph’, this would then seem open to decoding, at one level at least, in a way that 
would appear to privilege narration itself  as the means by which to track the 
commodity back to the sphere of production and so render visible what lies behind it.
If Gursky’s images are vulnerable to the charge that they offer only to repeat a 
social reality ‘evident on the surface of things’ (Sekula 2004: 135), unable to say 
anything other than, ‘What a beautiful world’, because they fail to make ‘connections’ 
other than those of ‘abstract’ formal repetition, it is tempting as such to understand a 
work like Fish Story as that which renounces the single image, by contrast, in the 
name of a renunciation of abstraction itself. This is certainly implied in Pamela Lee’s 
26
own stark opposition of Gursky’s ‘ethereal’ images to what she presents as Sekula’s 
bringing of ‘consciousness down to earth’, restoring ‘the heaviness of material 
relations [that] resist sublimation into the ether’ (Lee 2012: 98). Referring to what she 
calls Marx’s ‘literary nods to the mystical’, from which his metaphor of the ‘ethereal’ 
derives, as capturing ‘the psychology, superstitiousness, and, more to the point, false 
consciousness of the subject of capital’ that underlies the ‘irrational nature of 
commodity fetishism’, by implication it is the re-materialization effected by Sekula’s 
work that constitutes its realism in dispelling such ‘false consciousness’ itself (88).
Yet, one should remember here Sekula’s own ‘phenomenological point’ at the 
outset of Fish Story, for if photodocumentary might well place itself, like ‘sailors and 
dockers’, in a ‘position to see the global patterns of intrigue hidden in the mundane 
details of commerce’ – bringing back to the shores of visibility what has been hidden 
by the fetishism of the commodity – the contrary danger is that of a ‘crude 
materialism’, the ‘delusion’ that  ‘a global economy could be seen and heard and 
smelled’ as such (Sekula 2002: 12). For the ‘irrational nature’ of the fetish-like 
character of the commodity form is precisely not merely a question of psychology, or 
even ‘false consciousness’, but of the objective reality of abstraction itself. The 
‘fault’, in other words, lies not straightforwardly in ‘consciousness’, but lies, as Chris 
Arthur puts it, out there, and ‘moves within the object itself’ (2001: 41). 
There are, in other words, and to put it crudely, two different forms of 
abstraction and invisibility at stake here: that invisibility of labour and production that 
can, in principle, be partly rectified in the image, and that essential invisibility which 
just is intrinsic to the real abstraction of capital as such, and lies inherently ‘outside’ 
the image tout court. If, as Sekula suggests, a dynamics of realism as a rendering 
visible of what is hidden is thus already complex - ‘A crate breaks, spilling its 
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contents. But that’s too easy an image of sudden disclosure, at once archaic and 
cinematic, given that sailors rarely see the thrice-packaged cargo they carry 
nowadays’ (1997: 32) – this relates not only to the difficulty of opening or seeing 
inside the container (as if that itself would ‘show’ us capital), but the problem of the 
representational dilemma posed by the fact that one cannot actually show the abstract 
form of exchangeability that propels the social system ‘in the first place’. Instead, one 
can only render the abstract itself visible as invisible within the narrative structure of 
the ‘work’. 
In this sense, the renunciation of the single image as the condition of a ‘claim 
to realism’ is necessitated here, in part, because capital itself ‘appears’ only in the 
peculiar nature of the relations between images and things that it establishes (i.e. in 
the abstract and ‘invisible’ form of that relation itself). While the images that are 
organised into narrative in Fish Story to produce a ‘critical understanding’ of our 
social world may, of necessity, be focused on the all-too-material and visible, what, 
equally necessarily, propels its ‘plotting’ is that which can never be shown in any 
image itself. If there is a final paradox of realism it lies perhaps there. 
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 One limitation of Stimson’s own focus on serial form is, however, the ways in which 
its ‘vision of photography as a medium of sociality’, and a ‘new form of political 
subjectivity’, is ultimately restricted to a now lost mode of collectivity: that is, the 
Nation (2006: 169).  See Roberts 2014: 33-35. Although, then, Stimson recognises the 
crucial sense in which ‘nationalism’ itself is a ‘form of abstraction’ (169), as well as, 
for example, in his account of Riis (and defence of the latter’s ‘bourgeois 
abstraction’), referring to serialism’s capacity to give expression to ‘the underlying 
essential economic relations in the form of class conflict, whether it wanted to or not’, 
this is not extended to any detailed consideration of the social relations constituted 
through real abstraction (in the value form) as themselves constituting a certain mode 
of collectivity, if a profoundly ‘inhuman’ one. As I will suggest, this is key to 
understanding what would make the serial forms of, say, Sekula (or, in another 
fashion, Andreas Gursky) different perhaps from those covered in Stimson’s book.
2
 If one historical manifestation of the ‘renunciation of the single image’ has, then, 
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been centred on the specific sequential form of the photo-book, and thus (as Sekula 
often suggests) to the novel (particularly in its more ‘epic’ dimensions), this, of 
course, raises the question of its relation to not only literature but cinema also. ‘I have 
found that I have looked more to cinema for models’, suggests Sekula (2004: 156), 
while in ‘Dismantling Modernism, Reinventing Documentary’ he argues that ‘the 
most developed critiques of the illusory facticity of photographic media have been 
cinematic, stemming from outside the tradition of still photography’ (1978: 869). (By 
contrast, and significantly, Barthes described his motivation for writing Camera 
Lucida as one directed ‘against film’.) Indeed, as Roberts notes in Photography and 
its Violations, arguably the formation of a radical conception of photographic realism 
in the twentieth century emerged in some sense through its very subordination to 
cinema, and thus ‘its need to transform its functions into a filmic or protofilmic 
language’. As he concludes: ‘There is no realism of the contingent and no sequential 
photo practice in Alexander Rodchenko and El Lissitsky, Walker Evans and James 
Agee, without Sergei Eisenstein and Dziga Vertov’ (2014: 41). Some of the 
complexities contained in this relationship between photography and cinema are 
identifiable in comparing this with Stimson’s celebration, by contrast, of photographic 
serialism over film, which, he argues, collapses ‘the analytical, atemporal space 
opened up the abstraction of serial photography back into a false synthetic naturalism 
of time’ (2006: 37; emphasis added). I leave such specific complexities of this 
relationship aside here for another occasion however.
3
 Benjamin’s reference is to Renger-Patzsch’s anthology The World is Beautiful 
published in 1928.
4
 This famous passage from Brecht reappears across Sekula’s oeuvre, including in the 
early ‘Dismantling Modernism, Reinventing Documentary’, where, for example, he 
criticizes Lewis Baltz’s new topographic ‘photographs of enigmatic factories’ 
precisely because they ‘fail to tell us anything about them, to recall Brecht’s remarks 
about a hypothetical photograph of the Krupp works’ (1978: 870).
5
 The same point is made elsewhere in a more theoretical register, drawing on Marx’s 
Grundrisse: ‘Reified social relations are in a sense invisible … [and] can only be 
understood through recourse to abstraction, or … through the movement upwards 
from the concrete to the abstract, and back down to the concrete’ (Sekula, 1997: 49).
6
 In the latter case, a specifically ‘artistic abstraction’ can certainly be conceived, in 
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J.M. Bernstein’s words, as combating a ‘societal abstraction’ (or the ‘scientistic’) by 
asserting an affective and sensuous particularity to be found precisely within the 
materiality of the aesthetic object itself (Bernstein, 2006: 151-152; see also 
Cunningham 2013), just as, from a rather different direction, it is, one might say, the 
snapshot’s very particular connection to specific biographies and everyday lives – its 
‘concreteness’ of reference – that has, in a contrary fashion, made it exemplary of a 
specifically anti-aestheticist resistance to the abstractions of an interchangeability of 
images characteristic of mass media.
7
 Sekula here prefigures the more extended discussion in his essay ‘The Body and the 
Archive’ (1986) of the systematising impulse in the uses of photography by the likes 
of Bertillon and Francis Galton that links early social uses of the photograph to 
criminology and eugenics, as well as pseudo-sciences like phrenology. Crucial to this 
is the ways in which, on Sekula’s partly Foucaultian account, the apparently 
democratic and egalitarian dimensions of photography were, more or less from its 
beginnings, tied up with systems of ‘classification’ that in fact constructed new modes 
of class, gender or racial distinction.
8
 See http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/ch01.htm#S4 
9
 One could compare here the broadly Lukácsian distinction implied, for example, 
against photography’s reduction to the descriptive mode, in Dyer’s critical contrast of 
Garry Winogrand with Dorothea Lange: ‘Lange was faithful to George Steiner’s 
comment on Balzac: that if he “describes a hat, he does so because a man is wearing”. 
The photographers of the new generation will describe a hat just because it happens to 
be somewhere’ (Dyer 2012: 148).
10
 Conversely, Emerson, for example, writing in the 1840s, identifies the danger in 
literary language that ‘a paper currency is employed when there is no bullion in the 
vaults’, demanding of the poet that he (or she) ‘pierce these rotten dictions and fasten 
words again to visible things… [to become] a commanding certificate, or fully 
underwritten currency’ (cited in Armstrong 1999: 291).
